Desk-Top
Guide for Supervisors
Visitors Since
October 15, 2001.
Past Articles
* Computer Security
* Foreign Espionage
* Industrial Espionage
* Personal Security
* Personnel Security
* Physical Security
* Security Management
Other Security Links
E-Mail Us
* ASIS
* NCMS
* VSAC
* Webmaster
We join with those who mourn the loss of life, the injuries, and the disruption of lives caused by the attacks against Washington, DC, and New York, N.Y. All those effected -- the brave people who helped in rescue efforts, those involved in America's response to terror and in the war with Iraq-- are in our thoughts and prayers.
.
When an individual has been the subject of a favorable investigation, and has been issued a security clearance, that individual’s trustworthiness is a matter of continuing evaluation by supervisors and co-workers, alike.
Supervisors must be constantly alert, and report actions or indicators which reflect that an employee (or other cleared individual) may be a potential security risk.
The reporting of adverse information concerning employees plays an important role in the organization's personnel security program.
The following are types of adverse information which should be routinely reported to the FSO: a) criminal activities; b) unauthorized disclosure of classified information; c) irrational behavior; d) bizarre or notoriously disgraceful conduct; e) excessive use of intoxicants; f) excessive indebtedness or recurring financial difficulties, including garnishments; g) use of illegal substances such as marijuana, heroin and cocaine.
Besides the information noted above, the following indicators have
been seen in many espionage cases:
-Unexplained Affluence-
-Forming Close Ties with Nationals of Foreign Countries-
-Recurring and/or Unexplained Foreign Travel-
-Workaholic with High Degrees of Access-
-Unauthorized Removal or Reproduction of Classified Materials-
-Works Alone-
-Stays in Job Nobody Wants-
An indicator not listed but worthy of mention, because it has surfaced during several espionage cases, is the unusually curious/inordinately nosey employee – persistent questions regarding subject matters far outside his/her job scope; always seen wandering and hovering around places and equipment he or she has no business in or with.
A final reminder that in each spy case which has occurred, the perpetrator has exhibited one or more of these indicators. Had they been reported when they became apparent, loss of billions of dollars in research and development (our technological advantage), and operational capability, could have been avoided.
The effectiveness of our security and counterintelligence support to national security is directly and vitally dependent upon the early reporting of any possible indicators.
It’s up to supervisors, co-workers and individuals themselves to make
the Personnel Security Program work.
