Operations Security (OPSEC):
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We join with those who mourn the loss of life, the injuries, and the disruption of lives caused by the attacks against Washington, DC, and New York, N.Y. All those effected -- the brave people who helped in rescue efforts, those involved in America's response to terror and in the war with Iraq-- are in our thoughts and prayers.
ITT Industries, Systems Division
Vandenberg AFB, CA
The OPSEC process was conceived over thirty years ago during the Vietnam War. At the time, the most pressing need of military commanders and operational planners was to conceal their intentions from the adversary who was seemingly able to anticipate every move, choose the time and place of confrontation, and more often than not, evaporate like mist after doing great damage to U.S. armed services personnel. Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy forces consistently received advance warnings of allied intentions. As a result, counterintelligence assets were directed to catch spies and security specialists were told to identify discrepancies and weaknesses in the handling of classified information. No spies were found. And, although some minor problems were identified and corrected in the way classified information was being handled, there was no discernible change in the enemy’s ability to routinely predict military operations and inflict terrible casualties upon allied forces.
Clearly, a different approach was needed. This was the start of the OPSEC process: a process to analyze military operations, identify the sources of the enemy’s abilities to determine allied actions in advance of those actions, and to implement countermeasures. Initially, the OPSEC process started with interviews of operations and support personnel to see what exploitable activities they were involved with and how that information might be being passed to the enemy.
As the process matured and gathered information was analyzed, it was quickly discerned how bodies of exploitable information, beyond those protected by traditional security programs, were just hanging out there for the enemy to see and to react upon. What was there for the enemy was the observables (indicators), the unclassified information, unclassified physical characteristics, events, and communications that gave the enemy a knowledge of our intentions, our operations, and our methodology for conducting the war. The most common fixes for these indicators were changes in policies, practices, and procedures involving, for the most part, unclassified information and activities – simple and common sense fixes.
The OPSEC process was a proven success during the later stages of the war. Given the understanding provided during OPSEC surveys, commanders and operational planners were not only able to enhance the protection of information they deemed critical (both classified and unclassified), but also to implement changes that enhanced operational efficiency.
After the Vietnam War, it was determined OPSEC had to be divorced from the notion that it was exclusively a war activity. But, not until 1983 did OPSEC get recognition as a national program whose application was recognized as more than applicable to just combat operations.
(Editor’s Note: This ends the first installment – next issue we’ll
discuss NSDD 298 and the OPSEC process.)
[Webmaster's Note: This article originally appeared in the September 2000 issue of the VSAC News.]